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Clinical Research in Child Psychoanalysis 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
 
Research in psychoanalysis, or the alleged lack of it, has become a burning 
topic in the field of British psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.  The 
widespread  insistence by government policy-makers and health service 
managers on 'evidence-based medicine', as an aspect of public service  
'modernisation',   has  understandably extended to demands that mental 
health services should  be better  justified by the evidence of empirical 
research.  This faces psychoanalytic psychotherapists and other exponents of 
'talking cures' with the challenge of how to justify their public existence.   This 
is not  an entirely new problem, of course, since in Anglo-Saxon cultures 
psychoanalytic ideas have long been criticised as 'unscientific' or 'pseudo-
scientific'  through the influence of Karl Popper's philosophy of science, and 
through the predominantly 'empiricist' training of most academic and clinical 
psychologists. 
 
But while psychoanalysis has been placed under this rather hostile pressure, 
other cultural changes have been working  in its favour.  Historians and 
sociologists of science such as T.S. Kuhn  (1962, 2000)  and Bruno Latour  
(1983, 1987) have demonstrated in their studies that the sciences do not 
conform to unitary prescriptions, but are in reality  quite diverse. (Galison and 
Stump 1996). Different 'objects of study' give rise to different 'methods of 
study' -   to  different ontologies correspond  different epistemologies. Thus 
evolutionary biology, which makes much of descriptions, classifications and 
differences, does not have the same methodological form as theoretical 
physics, with its more theoretically  and mathematically based universalism. 
The human sciences, whose 'objects of study'  (people and societies)  are 
often transformed by the ways in which they are described and theorised  are 
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different from these natural sciences in yet other ways.  In Britain  a 
widespread movement to include psychoanalytic programmes, both clinical 
and academic, in university curricula in the last two decades, has also made a 
positive  difference, since  postgraduate and especially doctoral level courses 
require more sophisticated reflection on methodological issues than was the 
case when trainings were confined within professional institutions. 
 
Two developments within the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic field 
have followed in this situation. The first is a significant  attempt to bridge the 
divide between 'mainstream' social science research methods, and 
psychoanalysis, for example in the work of Peter Fonagy (2003)  by finding 
ways of 'operationalising' psychoanalytic ideas,  giving more replicable and 
predictable form to therapeutic interventions, and developing  reliable 
measures of treatment outcome. 1 The strategy here is to bring 
psychoanalysis closer to mainstream social science approaches, and 
enhance its legitimacy by this means.  Critics of this approach perceive in it a 
risk of dilution of psychoanalytic methods and principles, in the search for 
scientific acceptability and policy-relevance. The second  development is 
attempts  to clarify and justify  the methods of   knowledge-generation which 
have been followed throughout the history of psychoanalysis itself, and to 
understand their necessary relationship to the primary object of study of 
psychoanalysis, namely unconscious mental processes. This approach 
follows the  precepts and example of recent historians and  sociologists of 
science in holding that it will be more enlightening to describe  how practising 
scientists make sense of what they actually  do, than to prescribe  what they 
should or should not be doing. Thus clarifying  the ways in which  knowledge  
has in fact been generated within the psychoanalytic tradition is deemed to be 
the best starting point for improving its methodological sophistication.   A 
number of writers have taken this approach, for example in the 75th 
anniversary special issue of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis on 
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 The programme of clinical and research practice based on the concept of 'mentalisation' is 
the strongest example of this approach (Bateman and Fonagy 2004).  
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Clinical Facts (1994) edited by David Tuckett,  and in Rustin (2002,  2007) , 
and Hughes (2004) .  Debates between these different perspectives can be 
found in Fonagy  (2003),  Rustin (2003), Midgley (2004, 2006), and Mace, 
Moorey and Roberts (2001) 
The primary site of psychoanalytic discovery has from the beginning been the 
clinical consulting room.  This is because the main object of psychoanalytic 
investigation, the unconscious mind, can be most easily studied in the 
'laboratory-like' conditions of the consulting room, with (especially given  
modern 'technique' )  its stable and reliable setting, its fixed duration and 
frequency of sessions, and with its reliance on the phenomena of the 
transference and counter-transference as its main 'evidence'.   The impact of 
unconscious mental phenomena in everyday life is ubiquitous and profound, 
but it is much more difficult to trace its effects in 'outdoor' conditions than it is 
in the constructed situation of the transference relationship.  James Strachey's 
description (Strachey 1934)   of how the role of fantasy can be made evident 
to analysands by demonstrating,  little by little, differences between their (mis) 
perceptions of their  analyst and the reality,  was a crucial one.  Thus the 
ontology of psychoanalysis - its particular conception of what exists -   is 
linked to its epistemology - its means of perceiving its  object.  The means of 
investigation of many if not all sciences are equivalently  connected to their 
chosen object of interest,  through the design of specific instruments of  
measurement,  for example.   
 
In the humanities, parallel connections are to be seen, though  these are 
usually formulated as the necessary relations between content and form, 
rather than ontology and epistemology, being and perceiving.  Thus lyric 
poetry, tragic drama, and realist novels, develop different forms which can 
grasp the particular areas of experience which they are exploring. 
Psychoanalysis shares attributes with both the sciences and the humanities,  
sharing attributes  of each of these respectively generalising and 
particularising kinds of inquiry.  
 
Methods of  study thus differ in relation to their objects.   But there is another 
important source of variance between fields of investigation, and this is the 
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relation between methods of inquiry  and the intended audiences for, or users 
of, new knowledge that emerges from it.  In the case of psychoanalysis, the 
primary community for whom its findings have been intended has been that of 
practising psychoanalysts themselves, and the purpose of its concepts, 
theories and classifications has been to guide analysts in their consulting 
room practice.  Of course, psychoanalytic ideas have been widely taken up in 
western culture, and are now part of the understandings of everyday life.  
Nevertheless, the primary source of its knowledge has been clinical work with 
patients, and it is for this reason that one of its primary 'inscription devices' , or 
means of communicating its findings, (Latour 1987) has been the clinical case 
study. 
 
One can think of the body of psychoanalytic theories  as the evolving  
outcome of a Kuhnian 'scientific revolution'  initially accomplished by Freud.  
This brought into existence a new paradigm of knowledge, whose 
fundamental ideas at the beginning were the unconscious, fantasy, 
repression, the transference, the oedipus complex etc..  From these early 
moments of 'revolutionary science' the practice of a 'normal science' then 
developed,  in which psychoanalysts set out to solve 'puzzles' posed within 
the foundational theory.  'Puzzle-solving' within psychoanalysis concerned 
itself with stages of development  (the issues of narcissism,  paranoid-
schizoid and depressive positions, the mid-life crisis);  pathological states 
(autism, the neuroses, psychotic states, borderline states, and more local 
dysfunctions such as eating disorders, sexual disorders etc.): and with 
questions of technique (Klein's 'play-therapy',  the treatment of severely 
disturbed children, Joseph's 'total transference situation', etc.)  One should 
view the development of psychoanalytic theory and technique as primarily the 
outcome of a clinical research programme conducted by psychoanalytic 
practitioners over a period of more than a hundred years. 
 
The 'normal science' of the psychoanalyst or psychoanalytic psychotherapist 
includes the problems of understanding individual patients, in their 
particularity.  This is part of its distinctive   'ethical'  and 'aesthetic'  
commitment,  in which it seeks  to aid persons in their own self-understanding,  
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as individuals with unique histories and relationships, rather than merely as 
members of  diagnostic categories.  Psychoanalysis sets out to enable 
individuals to be themselves,  in some way which they themselves can feel is  
good enough. It is  not only about solving symptomatic problems, or achieving 
a measure of acceptable normality.  
 
The interest of psychoanalysis in the diversity of its subjects, and a mode  of 
practice (summarised as 'free association')  which ensures a high degree of 
unpredictability in how they will  display  themselves, has implications for the 
kind of knowledge which is found most useful to practitioners. ( Polanyi 1958) 
Psychoanalysts make use of psychoanalytic concepts and theories as 
symbolic resources available to guide them in the understanding of clinical 
phenomena as they present themselves, not as 'textbook knowledge' to be 
applied to phenomena which have already been classified  prior to their 
appearance.  Though clients can be assessed prior to analysis, and 
judgements can be made about their states of mind and psychic history, such 
assessment rarely does more than establish some broad expectations. 
Indeed some have  persuasively argued that the most important thing to 
establish in a psychoanalytic assessment is a patient's capacity to respond to 
a psychoanalytic setting. (Rustin 1982, Rustin and Quagliata 1999).  
 
T.S. Kuhn, in The Road Since Structure (2004) suggested that the 
development of science has parallels to biological evolution, in that what takes 
in both is a process of speciation or differentiation.  Kuhn describes 'the 
speciation-like process through which  new disciplines emerge, each with own 
lexicon, and each with its own area of knowledge.' (Chapter 4 p 100).  This 
not only fits the development of psychoanalysis as a field, but also the 
increasing differentiation of knowledge within psychoanalysis, as its lexicon of 
classifications of psychological conditions, developmental patterns, 
techniques, etc., expands in response  to clinical experiences.   
 
Most of the time in psychoanalytic practice, practitioners seek to understand 
their patients using the lexicon of concepts etc. available to them in the 
literature, and learned during their  training and supervision. It is difficult 
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enough to find fit between experience and some already-existing ideas, good 
enough to  help the therapeutic process.  But sometimes clinicians find 
themselves looking not only at the patient, from the perspective of the 
available psychoanalytic ideas, but also at the adequacy  of the ideas 
themselves  to give meaning to the clinical situation.  Sometimes when the 
'container' seems inadequate to 'contain' its object,  it is found necessary to  
modify the container itself. One can see the development of many crucial 
concepts in psychoanalytic history  as the outcome of a revision to existing 
thinking, brought about by the need to account for an intractable clinical 
phenomenon.  Paula Heimann's (1950) discovery of the 'counter-transference' 
as a valid source of understanding, and Herbert Rosenfeld's (1971) bifurcation 
of the concept of narcissism into its libidinal and destructive variants, are two 
examples.  
 
It is has often been particularly gifted psychoanalysts who have brought about 
such major innovations. (The theoretical developments initiated by Klein, 
Bion, Winnicott, Joseph, and Meltzer are some  examples).   But in the field of 
child psychotherapy in recent years, one can see a more collegial style  of 
innovation in operation, as 'clinical workshops' (Rustin 1991) have sustained 
groups of colleagues in developing new areas of work,  even though there are 
usually outstanding psychoanalytic  practitioners among them.   
 
As doctoral programmes in child psychotherapy in Britain have developed, 
more practitioners find themselves explicitly engaged in 'clinical research', 
since as a condition of doctoral study they are expected to identify a 
psychoanalytic topic in which they hope to make an original contribution to 
knowledge.  Such practitioners have to reflect more rigorously on research 
methods than has been traditionally the case in psychoanalytic study. This 
has led to a number of studies (e.g. Hindle 2000, Anderson 2003, Reid 2003)   
in which psychotherapists have continued to undertake their normal form of 
psychoanalytically-based practice with patients, but have taken greater care 
to select patients with presenting similarities, to facilitate comparison, and 
even more important have developed methods of analysing clinical data (often 
using 'grounded theory' methods derived from Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
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Tuckett 1994)   which are more systematic and accountable than in 
conventional case-write-ups  In this way further 'sub-fields' of classification 
and explanation are being developed, providing new resources for clinicians 
to refer to in their practice.   
 
It is interesting to reflect from this point of view on Margaret  Rustin's paper in 
this symposium 'Finding an Authentic Voice: Observation, Intuition and the 
use of Counter-Transference in work with children and adolescents'.  In the 
main,  her paper shows  how approaches already established in the 
psychoanalytic literature can be used by an experienced clinician to 
understand and work with  difficult patients.  The paper shows how an 
informed understanding of current developments in psychoanalysis can 
extend therapeutic possibilities.  The discussion of  observational methods 
refers to a great deal of work which has been going on in recent years in 
Britain and France, to develop  Infant Observation (as originated by Esther 
Bick) not only as a valuable form of pre-clinical training, but also as a source 
of psychoanalytic understanding in its own right. (Rustin 2006, Waddell 2006).   
There is a description of an episode from one infant observation,  describing  
unconscious communications made to the observer, and putting to a 
successful test her capacity to contain the intense anxieties of the parents of a 
baby who had  been accidentally injured.  The discussion of the 'counter-
transference' and the 'total transference situation'  which are important to 
understand this observational experience, also shows  how attention to the 
patients'  unconscious communications to the therapist of  their states of mind, 
through projective identification, can provide resources for understanding 
patients who seem on the face of it to be communicating very little, but who 
may mainly be conveying their  distrust of emotional contact of any kind.  
 
Margaret Rustin's paper is  primarily  intended as an example of how a child 
psychotherapist  can make use of selected  new ideas and techniques to do 
difficult clinical work. It does not explicitly propose innovations in theory or 
technique, or present itself as a contribution to psychoanalytic research. 
Nevertheless, I think one can discern in the paper  at least one  implicit topic 
for research, within the context of the 'speciation' and 'puzzle-solving' of 
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'normal science.'  The topic might be identified as that of 'silent patients', of 
which two clinical  examples are given.  The 'research questions' might be 
these.  How can we do psychoanalysis,  which normally depends on talk,  with  
patients who refuse to talk? And, what meanings can be located in patients' 
refusal to talk to their therapists?  How  might therapists understand these 
silent episodes,  in particular by reference to their own counter-transference 
experiences, and through  the idea that patients push states of mind into their 
therapists in the implicit  hope that they might then be understood?    Failure 
to attend sessions, even over a lengthy period, may sometimes be regarded 
in the same light,  in so far as it leaves the therapist bearing the anxiety of 
feeling rejected and 'out of mind', perhaps with a surmise  that the therapist 
may  understand and later do something with this feeling.  2 
 
There are no assurances  that a 'presenting phenomenon' like that of patients' 
persistent  silence, which may be of considerable clinical  concern, should 
become a topic for clinical research. Theoretically, it might be that the 
'symptom' expresses too many different states of mind to be a useful focal 
point for investigation.  Methodologically, there is the problem that it would not 
be possible to pre-select a sample of patients for treatment for this condition, 
(unlike severe depression or anorexia for example) since it manifests itself 
within the therapeutic setting, after treatment has been commenced for other 
reasons.  (Although patients might be referred to psychotherapeutic treatment 
because of a wider inability or refusal to communicate, which might or might 
not then be re-enacted in the clinical situation.). 
 
 
But one could imagine that cases of this kind undertaken by different 
practitioners could be gathered together for reflection and for systematic 
analysis,  perhaps within a clinical workshop setting. If good sessional records 
are maintained, subsequent analysis of  them can be undertaken,  comparing 
cases undertaken by different clinicians. One can certainly imagine that some 
exploration of this specific clinical phenomenon in the literature,  setting out 
                                            
2
 Margaret Rustin has discussed one experience of this kind in Rustin M.E.  (2001).  
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how it can be understood and managed, might  be valuable to clinicians, 
providing another 'classification' or 'kind' in their lexicon of clinical 
phenomena, to guide  them should they meet it  in their practice. In this case it 
forms a  particular instance in broader current genre of clinical study, namely 
that of the technical issues involved in treating deprived or otherwise difficult 
child patients.  This guidance  is, in an  informal way, what Margaret Rustin's 
paper already offers.  It is not a very big step to imagine this as a topic for 
more systematic investigation.  
 
This is not to say this should be done. Topics for clinical research are best 
identified by practitioners themselves, arising from their own clinical 
experience and their interests in current developments of theory and 
technique in the field. In any case, there is never going to be time or money to 
research every topic that is of interest to clinicians, and  traditional forms of 
clinical writing will remain indispensable.  Furthermore, some conceptual 
starting points will be more fruitful than others.  Probably the best work takes 
place where a sub-field has already been defined, and the 'puzzles' within it 
have some coherent relation to one another. Clinical research in child 
psychotherapy on autistic spectrum disorders (Alvarez and Reid  1999)  and 
psychotherapy  with severely deprived children (Boston and Szur 1983)  are 
examples of productive sub-fields.   But as this brief paper on psychoanalytic 
research was originally presented  as a response to Margaret's, it seems 
worthwhile to suggest on an  indicative basis how one can think about her 
presentation in the context of  child psychotherapy's  clinical research 
programme. 
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